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Protestant Challenges to the ‘Protestant State’: Ulster Unionism and 
Independent Unionism in Northern Ireland, 1921-1939 
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Abstract 
This article considers intra-unionist divisions in interwar Northern Ireland, with an 
emphasis on the antagonistic relationship between the governing Ulster Unionist Party 
and a number of independent unionists. The article is divided into four sections. The 
first section briefly outlines the nature of independent unionism in pre-partition 
Ireland. The second section considers the politics of the inter-war Ulster Unionist 
Party, with an emphasis on its programme to create and maintain unionist unity. This 
provides the context for the third section, which examines the political contribution of 
a small band of independent unionists who stood outside this unity. The final section 
conducts an analysis of the electoral politics in inter-war Northern Ireland. This 
reveals that the most heated political cleavage in inter-war Northern Ireland was not 
the traditional unionist-nationalist battle line; it was instead the intra-unionist divide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 partitioned Ireland and established two 
devolved parliaments on the island: this was the British state’s solution to the 
conundrum of how to reconcile the competing demands of Irish nationalism and 
Ulster unionism.
1
 During the drafting of the Act, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 
lobbied for the creation of a six-county northern area. The Lloyd George coalition’s 
preferred option was for a nine-county region, based on the historic province of 
Ulster; but when the unionists threatened to wreck the Bill, the government backed 
down.
2
 Six-county ‘Ulster’ was much more homogeneous than the nine-county 
province, containing a comfortable Protestant majority. With religious identities 
almost exclusively determining political affiliations in Ireland under the Union, the 
UUP could look forward to wielding power indefinitely: the results of Northern 
Ireland’s first election in 1921 seemed to confirm this when the UUP won forty of the 
fifty-two seats in the new devolved parliament. As nationalists won the remaining 
twelve seats, there appeared little room in Northern Irish politics for sectional 
interests. 
 The UUP aimed to create a unionist monolith to secure its ruling position in 
Northern Ireland, and its domestic agenda was largely shaped by the concern of unity. 
But a small number of unionist political actors operated from outside the boundaries 
of the official party during the inter-war period. In 1923, an independent unionist was 
elected to the northern parliament; two more followed in 1925 and another again in 
1929. These independents, as well as the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), 
which was founded in 1924, provided the most vocal opposition to the Unionist Party. 
This article will explore the politics of independent unionism, demonstrating that the 
most heated electoral battleground in Northern Ireland between the two World Wars 
was not between unionism and nationalism but within the unionist family.  
 
Pre-Partition Independent Unionism 
As a cross-class alliance, the imperative of containing internal divisions shaped the 
dynamics of Ulster unionism as much as that of facing the external threats of Irish 
nationalism and Catholicism. The most prominent example of this impulse before the 
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partition of Ireland was the creation of the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) in 1905, 
partly a response to challenges by two very different independent unionists, T. W. 
Russell and Thomas Sloan, to official unionism’s hegemony. The UUC provided 
Ulster unionism with the local organisation required to dampen unionist dissent and 
mobilise grassroots support: the incredible level of unity and involvement of the 
unionist masses during the Ulster crisis years shortly afterward were testament to the 
Council’s successes. The UUC galvanised official unionism, while the menace of 
Home Rule sustained it. Unintentionally, then, Russell and Sloan were driving forces 
in the process of ‘moulding twentieth-century unionism from nineteenth-century 
toryism’.3  
 This was not, however, evident at the time. The campaigns of Russell and 
Sloan caused immense panic within UUP circles, which fretted at the potential 
breakdown of unionist unity. Russell was an articulate liberal unionist in a classic 
late-Victorian/early Edwardian sense while Sloan represented an urban hard-line 
unionism, sectarian in outlook and populist in attitude. What united both these 
templates of unionist dissent was a strong element of class politics: Russell was an 
outspoken campaigner for Ulster’s tenant farmers while Sloan was the figurehead of 
the Protestant proletariat of Belfast who felt that established unionism ignored 
working class interests. 
 Russell was sent to Westminster to represent South Tyrone in 1886, and he 
quickly became a key, if temperamental, unionist propagandist. ‘It is not easy to 
manage him’, Joseph Chamberlain would argue in 1894, ‘but our friends might [wish] 
to recollect that he has done more work for the Union than any other Irishman’.4 
While celebrated within British unionist circles, at the turn of the century Russell 
began besieging the landed elite of Irish unionism. In his 1901 book, Ireland and 
Empire, Russell accused the landlords leading unionism of working only to further 
their own economic interests.
5
 The same year, Russell launched his campaign for 
compulsory land purchase in Ireland, which was greeted with disdain by his political 
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masters such as Colonel Edward Saunderson.
6
 This assault on behalf of tenant farmers 
forced Russell outside the ranks of the Unionist Party and shifted the political focus 
from London to rural Ulster for a brief time. Crucially, Russell’s campaign appealed 
to Catholic farmers to join the cause, arguing that a genuine cross-religious alliance 
should be forged to better the position of the small tenantry throughout Ireland.
7
 
‘Russellism’ won two by-elections in Ulster through 1902-3; but despite Russell’s 
appeal for nationalist support, his programme was articulated in the language of 
unionism. While campaigning for a Russellite candidate in 1902, Russell first 
declared that his man was a staunch unionist: once this was clear, then he moved onto 
the land question.
8
 Seeking the backing of nationalist farmers could only be 
emphasised so much, as the Belfast pro-Union dailies would regularly snipe at 
Russell’s unionist bona fides, arguing that in opposing the UUP he was the puppet of 
Irish nationalism.  
Thomas Sloan’s political programme clearly had an influence on Northern 
Ireland’s first generation of independent unionists. Sloan was a shipyard worker who 
became politically active because he ‘contended that official unionist and Orange 
leaders disregarded working class interests and were too ready to yield to Catholic 
and nationalist pressure’.9 He was elected to parliament for South Belfast at a by-
election in 1902. ‘In labour matters’, Sloan announced in an interview that year, ‘his 
whole sympathies were with his fellow-workmen and the trade union movement’;10 
but as he was a leading figure of the Belfast Protestant Association, an extreme anti-
Catholic organisation, Sloan’s notion of labourism was heavily sectarianised. As well 
as his parliamentary opposition, Sloan also attacked official unionist hegemony 
through the Independent Orange Order (IOO), an organisation he established in 1903. 
The Order dabbled with progressive politics, most notably with its ‘Magheramorne 
                                                 
6
 Alvin Jackson, Colonel Edward Saunderson: Life and Loyalty in Victorian Ireland (Oxford, 1995), 
245-7. 
7
 Russell, Ireland and Empire, 277-8. 
8
 Irish Times, 23 January 1902. 
9
 J. W. Boyle, ‘The Belfast Protestant Association and the Independent Orange Order, 1901-10’, Irish 
Historical Studies, 13 (1962-3), 117. 
10
 Northern Whig, 31 July 1902. 
 5 
Manifesto’, but any social radicalism within the movement was firmly ‘subordinated 
to the sectarian element’.11  
The campaigns of Russell and Sloan were amplified by the weakness of the 
Ulster unionist organisational machinery, but this did not last long. In a matter of a 
few years, their separate campaigns were effectively contained and then destroyed by 
the Unionist Party. A combination of Sloan’s prominence in Belfast and the Russellite 
campaign fed into the founding of the UUC in 1905. As the formation of a distinct 
parliamentary Ulster Party in the 1880s was not coupled with the creation of lasting 
local structures, the activities of Russell and Sloan were allowed to flourish within 
several unionist heartlands: the ease of Sloan’s by-election victory in south Belfast 
over the official unionist candidate in 1902 is testament to the organisational 
deficiencies of the Unionist Party in Ulster.12 The UUC provided the co-ordinating 
muscle that Ulster unionism clearly lacked, and has been seen by one historian as the 
‘prototype’ for the northern parliament which was later to come into being.13 The eye 
of unionism was now as much in Belfast as London. 
Another important context in explaining the successes and failures of 
independent unionism during the Edwardian period is the position of the Irish national 
question. The Russellite and Sloanite agendas had also gone unchecked for several 
years because of the relative absence of the national question from the political 
mainstream. Within the realm of unionism, the constitutional status of Ireland (and 
later Northern Ireland) was the overriding factor in promoting unity within the 
movement. In the period of Conservative rule that overarched Russell’s and Sloan’s 
initial successes, ‘constructive unionism’ was to the fore, with limited reforms rather 
than major constitutional tinkering marking Irish policy.
14
 With Home Rule off the 
government’s agenda, there was scope for unionism’s cross-class alliance to 
fragment: Russell and Sloan were able to use this space to pursue their socio-
economic grievances. But the devolution crisis of 1904-1905 – when constructive 
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unionism went too far – marked the recovery of Ulster unionism, allowing the 
movement to return to a simplified sectarian political argument, which acted as 
cement for the UUC. 
The challenges posed by Sloan and Russell to official unionism were 
effectively neutralised after the creation of the UUC. Russellism was perhaps also 
undermined by the terms of the 1903 Land Act, which made it easier for tenants to 
buy their farms.
15
 At the 1906 election, nine candidates stood on a Russellite 
platform: only two won seats. Sloan survived the 1906 election, but lost his seat in the 
January 1910 election to an official candidate. A key component of his politics – 
sectarianism – was increasingly monopolised by the UUC. This factor also 
undermined the Russellite movement, which sought a degree of cross-community 
support.
16
 The Orange Order was given significant representation on the UUC: this 
signalled official unionism’s decisive willingness to formally ‘embrace religious 
sectarianism and the militant ethnic politics which accompanied it’.17 Membership of 
the IOO, small to begin with, rapidly shrunk from 1905. Its decline was mirrored by 
the increased significance of the Orange Order, which was to play a crucial role in the 
fight against Home Rule during 1912-14.
18
 Orangeism had become political capital 
within unionism.  
 The rise and fall of independent unionism in pre-partitioned Ireland was, then, 
intimately tied to the UUP’s organisational capabilities and the saliency of the 
national question. The bitter relationship between the UUP and the independent 
unionism of Russell and Sloan was a major dynamic within unionist politics before 
partition, and one that bears striking similarities to the inter-war conflicts in Northern 
Ireland.  
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Constructing Unionist Unity in Inter-war Northern Ireland  
Northern Ireland’s birth was arduous, with the new devolved administrative unit 
coming ‘under siege’ from numerous quarters.19 Sectarian conflict ravaged Belfast in 
1920-2; Irish nationalism within the six counties refused to recognise the new state’s 
legitimacy; the Provisional Government of the Irish Free State sponsored republican 
raids across the border and launched an economic boycott; and the threat of territorial 
loss through a Boundary Commission loomed ominously. In spite, or because, of 
these factors, Northern Ireland’s first Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, entered into 
two initiatives in 1922 with his counterpart in the Irish Free State, Michael Collins, in 
the hope of gaining a measure of legitimacy from nationalism for the partition 
settlement. In this bleak political context, though, neither man could deliver their side 
of the resulting pacts.
20
 Northern Ireland’s troubled development therefore continued 
through the inter-war period with an irredentist southern neighbour, an indifferent 
eastern neighbour and an internal minority who regarded the state as illegitimate. 
Craig reasoned in 1922 that the congruency of the new northern state could best be 
secured by a deal with the ‘enemy’ across the border; after this collapsed, he became 
more parochial and insular, looking more to unionism’s inbuilt numerical superiority 
for stability.
21
 The UUP therefore moved from a conciliatory attitude in 1922 to the 
more notoriously hostile rhetoric of the 1930s: ‘the Protestant Parliament for a 
Protestant people’. 
 An underlying dynamic in this shift was the challenges to the UUP that 
emerged in the inter-war period from within the Protestant bloc, chiefly from 
independent unionism and the NILP. The electoral threat of these ‘internal’ enemies 
illuminates two problems that the UUP administration encountered from within its 
own support base. The first concerned the nature of unionism itself: it was a fissile 
alliance, susceptible to fragmentation when placed under socio-economic strain. 
Protestant workers did not blindly support the UUP’s loyalism. The strength in 
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numbers of the UUP at Stormont
22
 during the inter-war period masked an increasing 
level of Protestant fragmentation which was occurring at the polls, particularly after 
the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s. When this was added to the growth 
of the NILP and nationalist strength in border areas, there was more of an electoral 
precariousness to the UUP’s position than is revealed by a cursory glance at the large 
majorities it racked up in Stormont.
23
 
The second problem overlapped with the first. Devolution did not transfer 
many financial powers to Northern Ireland: the UUP, therefore, gained the trappings 
of power without any significant economic clout. But elements of the pro-Union 
electorate blamed the UUP for Northern Ireland’s moribund inter-war economy. The 
nationalist commentator and author, Stephen Gwynn, prophetically discussed this 
issue in his 1924 book, Ireland, writing that it was  
 
highly conceivable that there may develop in Ulster a nationalism like that of 
the Dominions, based largely on a sense of local interests: and this will be 
stimulated alike by the presence of a Parliament possessing power to serve 
local needs and by the limitation which statute has placed upon these 
powers.
24
 
 
Serving ‘local needs’ is at the heart of devolution; but the limited nature of the 
Stormont regime left little space between the unionist grassroots and its leadership. 
The Northern parliament developed into a bulwark against official unionism’s 
enemies, internal as much as external,
25
 contributing greatly to the more unsavoury 
practices of the regime. Discrimination against the northern nationalist minority was 
encouraged more by a need to control and dampen dissident elements within the 
Protestant bloc and to preserve the electoral geography of Northern Ireland than by an 
ideologically guided sectarian campaign masterminded by the UUP.
26
 Nevertheless, 
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the fusion of party and state was disastrous for community relations in an already 
deeply divided society. 
 With unionist unity the objective, the UUP worked to diminish discontent 
from all elements of the Protestant bloc in Northern Ireland. There was a significant 
split at Cabinet level as to how this was to be achieved, with the administration 
divided into populist and anti-populist wings. For the Prime Minister, a populist 
governmental philosophy was the chief tool to build unionist unity: this consisted of 
sectarian argument with an economic underpinning through high public spending.
27
 
This quickly became the dominant position within the northern government; the 
minority anti-populist viewpoint, which stressed the need for the UUP to develop 
stringent fiscal policies and a conciliatory attitude to the Catholic minority, was little 
more than an ineffectual pressure group, particularly after 1925.
28
  
The economic plank of the UUP’s populism was important, as it revealed that 
the government believed that appeals to sectarianism alone would not suffice in the 
maintenance of unity. In 1922 the Northern Irish Cabinet ruled that welfare benefit 
legislation passed in Westminster would be matched in the six counties, regardless of 
the economic strain that this posed to the domestic Ministry of Finance.
29
 The UUP’s 
decision was deeply political, ‘conditioned by the guarantee to its Protestant working 
class supporters that devolution would not mean any lowering of standards’.30 A high 
consumption of public funds was seen as a safeguard against divisions within the 
Protestant bloc: the Minister of Labour, John Andrews, argued in 1926 that ‘serious 
consequences would ensue’ if the UUP did not spend generously on welfare, and this 
became the established norm.
31
  
  The greatest threat to unionist unity in the inter-war period came from mass 
unemployment, which fuelled the labour programmes of the NILP and various 
independent unionists. Despite the ideological and organisational weaknesses of the 
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labour movement in the north during 1920-2, years marked by sectarian strife and 
constitutional instability, the labour candidate Harry Midgely polled strongly in West 
Belfast in 1923.
32
 The formation of the NILP the following year represented a clear 
challenge to the UUP; but despite ripe conditions for a labourist or socialist upsurge 
amongst the Protestant working class in the inter-war period, Northern Ireland’s 
limited form of devolution was used by unionism to undermine radicalism. Midgely, 
elected to Stormont in 1933, lamented devolution, Northern Irish style: ‘After you 
have been here for a while’, he sadly conceded only one year later, ‘you become 
obsessed with the feeling that you can perform no useful function’.33 This self-
defeating attitude was fostered both by the limits of devolution and how the 
administration was operated by the UUP. Despite massive levels of unemployment – 
twenty-seven per cent of the insured labour work force was unemployed between 
1931 and 1939
34
 – the political culture of Northern Ireland was decidedly 
unsocialistic. Even the celebrated outdoor relief riots of 1932, which united elements 
of the Protestant and Catholic working classes, was defused promptly by UUP 
through anti-socialist and sectarian rhetoric, backed by a large increase in relief 
rates.
35
 
 The political forces of Northern Irish labour suffered from the same 
difficulties which beset its British and Irish counterparts in the inter-war period. The 
British Labour Party suffered from ‘intellectual bankruptcy’ when confronted by the 
depression; factional fighting and organisational chaos effectively neutered the Irish 
Labour Party.
36
 Sectarianism posed an additional problem to Northern Irish labour, 
with politico-religious divisions severely hindering Protestant and Catholic working 
class solidarity. These factors greatly aided the UUP’s plans for unionist unity; yet it 
is clear that the Unionist Party could not fully absorb Protestant labourism. In 1918 
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the UUP leadership established the Ulster Unionist Labour Association (UULA), a 
forum for proletarian unionism which was incorporated within the UUC.
37
 This was 
ostensibly to curtail working class radicalism following the Great War: just as the 
UUC was to provide local organisation to combat the challenges from Russell and 
Sloan, the UULA’s conception should be seen as the means employed by the unionist 
leadership to safely harness working class energy in an age of imminent universal 
suffrage. Its first president was John Andrews, a prominent member of the Unionist 
cabinet; but the UULA lacked any real teeth and failed to put a truly labourist agenda 
before the wider unionist party. Andrews’s blunt assertion from 1938 places the 
UULA in its political context: ‘During the sixteen years he had been Minister of 
Labour [claimed Andrews] he had endeavoured to keep employment out of the 
political arena. It was a great social problem which should not be dragged into party 
politics’.38 The UULA’s true value was the symbolism that it provided for the UUP in 
the crucial state-formation years of 1918-22, which gave the impression, at least, that 
proletarian concerns would be taken seriously by its bourgeois leadership.
39
 Given 
that its membership remained small, particularly post-partition, it is clear that 
ideologically and organisationally, unionism could not fully integrate labourism.
40
 
This left a gap in the political spectrum of Ulster unionism: this was the space filled 
by the most prominent inter-war independent unionists, who represented a form of 
sectarian labourism. 
 
The Independent Unionists 
Despite the electoral dominance of the UUP, the years between the twentieth 
century’s two World Wars have been described by one scholar as the ‘heyday’ of 
independent unionism in Northern Ireland.
41
 The 1920s and 1930s saw the emergence 
of vocal critics of the UUP from within the unionist bloc, with a handful of their 
number entering Stormont. Given the periodic abstention of nationalist members, the 
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independent unionists, along with the NILP, frequently acted as parliamentary 
opposition to the government. Graham Walker has ably examined the NILP’s inter-
war fortunes in recent years,
42
 but little is known about the independent unionists 
from the same period. They were numerically small, never numbering more than three 
in each of the five parliaments that sat from 1921 to 1939, but their presence at 
Stormont attracted much attention from the UUP. The independents mostly focused 
on critiquing the government’s socio-economic performance and its perceived 
commitment to maintaining the unionism in Northern Ireland: they were a source of 
great discomfort to the UUP, which portrayed itself as the last word in loyalism.  
A total of five independent unionists were elected to Stormont in the 1921-
1939 period: James W. Gyle; Thomas Henderson; Robert McNeill; John W. Nixon; 
and Colonel Philip J. Woods. Between them, they won thirteen electoral contests to 
Stormont. The lilliputian numbers of independent unionists inside the northern 
parliament was not for want of trying: the label suffered twenty losses at the polls of 
inter-war Northern Ireland. The vast majority of constituencies contested by 
independent unionists were in Belfast. The successful candidates did not constitute an 
independent party, although attempts were made in the 1930s to construct one. As 
their individual politics and interests differed, only the shared label ‘independent 
unionist’ linked them.  
 A range of factors contributed to the making of independent unionism. 
Thomas Henderson and John Nixon both had links with the UUP before they 
embraced the independent label: the UUP’s Shankill selection committee rejected 
Henderson as an official unionist candidate,
43
 and Nixon was an unsuccessful UUP 
candidate at the 1925 Stormont election. As independents, though, Henderson and 
Nixon represented the UUP’s most vocal and sustained opponents: both were fuelled 
by disillusionment with the government’s political boundaries, their perception of the 
UUP’s bourgeois and authoritarian nature and a sense of betrayal of the Protestant 
people of Ulster. Nixon was from Cavan, one of the three Ulster counties ‘lost’ to the 
Irish Free State through the partition settlement: he believed that the UUP had 
betrayed the Ulster Covenant of 1912 in acquiescing in the partition of Ulster as well 
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as Ireland.
44
 But Nixon’s career before politics also contributed to his antagonistic 
attitude to the UUP. As a District Inspector in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 
he was one of the most notorious characters associated with the Belfast violence of 
1920-22. Several eyewitness reports placed him as the head of a police ‘death squad’ 
which terrorised Catholic districts of Belfast, and implicated him in the brutal murder 
of the entire male line of the MacMahon family in 1922.
45
 A recent historian has 
queried these accusations; but, as Alan Parkinson has pointed out, the available police 
and government files on Nixon do not categorically either prove – or, indeed, 
disprove – his involvement in sectarian attacks.46 Guilty or not, Nixon was something 
of a folk hero in loyalist areas of Belfast, but he presented the UUP government with 
a range of problems. Richard Dawson Bates, the Minister of Home Affairs, succeeded 
in forcing Nixon out of the RUC in 1924 after the District Inspector made a series of 
political speeches at Orange Order meetings.
47
 Bates had been waiting for some time 
to remove the troublesome Nixon: in October 1922, he cryptically linked Nixon with 
illegality, telling Craig that ‘the Protestant hooligan is allowed to interpret in his own 
fashion the laws of the country’.48 He was savvy enough, though, to predict the 
backlash from ‘extreme’ Protestants if Nixon was dismissed from the RUC.49 The 
staunchest support for Nixon came from elements of the security forces, the Orange 
Order, the UULA and individual hard-line unionist MPs following his removal:
50
 this 
range of support offers an insight into his future electoral base. 
 While Thomas Henderson did not have a background in the security apparatus 
of the state, his independent unionism was, in many ways, similar to Nixon’s. Like 
Nixon, Henderson claimed descent from one of Ulster’s ‘lost’ counties – Monaghan –
and he attacked the UUP for betraying the true cause of Ulster Unionism.51 His 
independent unionism was, however, driven more by socio-economic assaults on the 
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government and the struggle of the unionist working class. While Nixon was also a 
champion of the Protestant proletariat, Henderson was more tenacious in voicing his 
condemnations of the UUP’s perceived economic failings. He once took to the floor 
of Stormont and spoke for nine and a half hours on the plight of the working class.
52
 
He may have sought a career within the UUP, but Henderson’s politics keenly placed 
him outside the borders of its cross-class hegemonic control.  
 Philip Woods, James Gyle and Robert McNeill combined a belief in the Union 
with Great Britain with a criticism of the UUP in its neglect of a particular issue to 
produce their independent unionist tags. Woods, a decorated former soldier who 
served in the Great War, represented dissatisfaction with the government’s handling 
of the employment of ex-servicemen: this single issue dominated his rhetoric in 
Stormont.
53
 McNeill was a lecturer at the Queen’s University of Belfast: he primarily 
voiced his opinions on educational matters.
54
 Gyle combined unionism with a desire 
to see the amendment of the Intoxicating Liquor Act: he campaigned tirelessly for 
public houses to be permitted to open on Sundays, with his background as a publican 
and wine merchant largely fuelling his grievance.
55
 In 1925, the Belfast News-Letter 
criticised what it saw as independent unionism’s ‘self-seeking nature’.56 Gyle can be 
seen as a vindication of this charge: politically, he was a one-issue activist, more 
independent than unionist. His constant repetition of the anti-prohibition cause 
obscured his unionism, which may have contributed to his electoral rout in 1929, after 
only four years in parliament. 
  The independent unionists inside Northern Ireland’s inter-war parliament, 
then, came from a range of different backgrounds, and epitomised Protestant 
discontent with elements of the UUP’s governing programme. There was no uniform 
pathway to independent unionism, and Nixon, Henderson, Woods, Gyle and McNeill 
all differed in their political emphases. But while the independent unionists were 
unbound by a party and were elected to Stormont to represent their constituents as 
individuals, a number of strands of thought can be drawn from their contributions. 
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The independent unionism of Thomas Henderson and John Nixon reveals a staunch 
Protestant interpretation of politics and life, very similar to that of their predecessor, 
Thomas Sloan. Robert McNeill, on the other hand, was schooled in a more liberal 
tradition, closer to the political philosophy of T. W. Russell. Philip Woods stood 
between the two groupings, displaying tendencies from both, while Gyle’s politics did 
not venture beyond anti-prohibition. What broadly united all the independents was the 
third strand: socio-economic criticisms of the UUP. Unionism was not a monolith; 
neither was independent unionism.  
 
Loyalism 
Henderson, Nixon and, to a lesser extent, Woods were keen to stress their extreme 
Protestantism as a central plank of their politics. Given the loyalist constituencies of 
Belfast these men represented, this is not that surprising. These areas had a history of 
standing outside the UUP’s sphere of direct influence, revealing the limitations of 
official unionist hegemony over working class Belfast. Henderson and Nixon 
represented the Shankill and the neighbouring Woodvale divisions respectively for 
over twenty years; as Frank Wright has noted, the Shankill area had a long and proud 
tradition of opposing established unionism.
57
 Woods served only a brief time in 
Stormont, but he did win two seats in 1925, topping the poll in South Belfast and 
picking up the second seat in West Belfast. South Belfast had sent two independent 
unionists to Westminster in succession before partition: William Johnston held the 
seat from 1868 to 1902, followed by Thomas Sloan. Henderson and Nixon in 
particular carried on this Belfast Protestant working class tradition of refusing to bow 
to orthodox unionism. The appeal of loyalist alternatives to the UUP in certain parts 
of Belfast was as strong after partition as it had been before.  
 Partition, as has been noted, shaped several of Henderson’s and Nixon’s bitter 
criticisms of the UUP, with both men stating that nine county Ulster had been broken 
up for the selfish and strategic concerns of the unionist leadership.
58
 But for both 
dissidents, the principles of unionism could only find meaningful political expression 
through an independent label, as the authoritarian office of the Chief Whip primarily 
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guided the Ulster unionist parliamentary party. Henderson and Nixon were as vocal in 
their condemnation of the Irish Free State and their desire to maintain the integrity of 
Northern Ireland as any member of the UUP. Henderson was infamous for deploying 
colourful language, tainted with militancy: as he declared in parliament in 1927, ‘the 
day that anyone tries to drive Ulster into the Free State’, Henderson would be found 
‘with a sword in my hand’.59 Henderson spoke glowingly about the UUP’s dedication 
to loyalist politics – he praised Craig’s ‘courage as an Ulsterman’60 – but despite such 
rhetoric, enjoyed good relations with the nationalists in Stormont. In 1934, he 
declared that he was proud to be a pallbearer at the funeral of Joseph Devlin, the 
northern nationalist leader.
61
  This attitude was, however, used as a weapon against 
him by the UUP. Campaigning on behalf of the official unionists in 1929, Lady 
Craigavon depicted Henderson as a man who ‘spent a great deal of his time with the 
Nationalists and Socialists’.62 But following his successful re-election that year, the 
Irish News, the major nationalist organ in the north, described Henderson as ‘more 
loyal than the official Unionists’.63 This was the central paradox of independent 
unionism: they were the staunchest of Orangemen, but they could collaborate with 
official unionism’s electoral enemies to attack UUP hegemony.   
 Nixon was more forthcoming in his loyalism than Henderson, which was 
reflected in his flirtation with extreme Protestant groupings such as the Ulster 
Protestant League in the inter-war period.
64
 He outlined his political credo in 1939, 
with its emphasis on independentism: 
 
I am an Independent Unionist, and that is a Unionist who is Independent. He 
neither gets anything nor wants anything. If there is any question of the Union, 
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and the Union only, being defended, I will be there. I will be following no 
man, because I will be the first to defend it.
65
 
 
The Union was the essence of Nixon’s politics and his sour relationship with the UUP 
was founded on a belief that Craig’s administration was a weakness to unionism. In 
this regard, Nixon was close to the sectarian politics of his independent predecessor, 
Thomas Sloan. Nixon frequently referred to the UUP as a ‘Lundy Government’, 
fuelled primarily by his bitterness at the loss of nine-county Ulster and an extreme 
brew of unionism and Orangeism.
66
 Nixon was relentless in undermining the 
government’s record from a Sloanite perspective, although like Henderson he avoided 
sectarian verbal clashes with the nationalists in Stormont. 
 Woods also displayed loyalist tendencies, but not to the same extent as 
Henderson or Nixon. Asked by ex-servicemen to represent their interests as a 
candidate at the West Belfast by-election in 1923, the ‘Fighting Colonel’ belatedly 
joined the Orange Order (at the age of forty-two) shortly before the poll: the UUP 
attempted to smear his campaign by asserting, probably correctly, that this move was 
too opportunistic and long overdue for one who claimed to be a Ulster loyalist.
67
 
Nonetheless, Woods’s political career in Stormont was dominated by the issue of the 
rights of ex-servicemen in terms of jobs, pensions and benefits. This also extended to 
members of the RUC and Ulster Special Constabulary: he stoutly supported Nixon 
after the controversial Distinct Inspector was dismissed from the police force, raising 
his case against the government in the northern parliament.
68
 Yet Woods’s loyalism 
was much more circumscribed than that of his fellow independent unionists. At the 
1925 election, he styled himself as a champion of the Protestants of Belfast who 
rejected the ‘fat clique’ of the official Unionist Party; yet he was uncomfortable with 
any notions of sectarianism.
69
 Woods was savvy about using the ‘Orange card’ to 
appeal to a Protestant electoral base outside the circle of the ex-servicemen he 
primarily represented, but appears not to have wholeheartedly embraced such rhetoric.  
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Liberal Unionism 
While the loyalist ideologies of Henderson and Nixon placed them to the right of even 
the most uncompromising UUP MP on the constitutional issue, there was another, 
much smaller, strain of independent unionism inside Northern Ireland’s inter-war 
parliament. Robert McNeill, MP for Queen’s University, was much more liberal and 
cosmopolitan than his fellow independents; his speeches in Stormont also reveal a 
level of intellectual astuteness that was often lacking from the benches of the UUP. 
He was, for instance, the only unionist during the debates on religious education in 
1930 to appreciate ‘the fundamental nature of the difference between the Protestant 
and Catholic attitudes to the Bible’70 – a key area of controversy in the government’s 
Education Act. His political persuasions were similar to those expressed by Russell in 
Ireland and Empire, although McNeill lacked the class conflict analysis of 
Russellism. He declared that he was a loyalist who had fought under the Union Jack, 
but was also an Irishmen sensitive to the concerns of the north’s Catholic 
population.
71
 This philosophy directed McNeill’s stance in his raison d’être, 
educational issues: he often acted as a lone voice in advocating structures of 
integrated and mixed religious schools.
72
 Conscious that he was swimming against the 
tide, McNeill quickly grew weary of his failure to influence the holders of power 
within the state and came to loathe the ‘fruitless discussion of party politics’. He 
resigned his seat in 1935 after only six years at Stormont, but not before departing 
with a muscular critique of politics in Northern Ireland in the 1930s: 
 
If the Government and the followers of the Government could rid themselves 
of that narrow, bigoted, intolerant spirit, which is not of the very essence of 
Protestantism, then I could see some hope for the future of Northern Ireland as 
an integral part of the British Commonwealth; but at the present time, having 
regard to the extreme temper which prevails on both sides, I entertain no hope, 
and I realise with sadness that my time in this House is absolutely wasted.
73
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Socio-Economic Criticisms 
All strands of inter-war independent unionism bombarded the UUP with socio-
economic criticisms. The Sloanites were the main opponents of the UUP in this 
regard, blending working class identities with Orange politics to produce sharply 
negative assessments of the government. Henderson was undoubtedly the loyalists’ 
most prominent champion of working class interests: his rhetoric and voting pattern in 
Stormont brought him closer to the NILP than the official party that shared his 
‘unionist’ label. This point was manipulated by the UUP in efforts to weaken 
Henderson’s support base. During the 1938 election campaign, the UUP announced 
the fact that Henderson had voted with the government only six times in 254 divisions 
from 1929 to 1937 as evidence that he was ‘disloyal’.74 He repeatedly slated the UUP 
for the chronic levels of unemployment in the inter-war period and for failing to 
provide a safety net for the destitute class: ‘As far as the unemployed are concerned 
there is no reason to hope that they are going to received anything from this 
Government’.75 In the aftermath of the outdoor relief riots, Henderson stormed out of 
Stormont with the NILP’s Jack Beattie, after the pair were blocked from raising the 
subject of unemployment.
76
 He was the most prominent speaker on social and 
economic issues in Stormont between the two World Wars, believing that the UUP 
sought only to protect the Protestant bourgeoisie: for this reason, he argued that ‘there 
was great need for men of independent spirit in the Northern Parliament’ to act as 
governmental watchdogs.
77
 As the UUP loathed entering socio-economic debates, 
Henderson was its prime enemy in inter-war Northern Ireland.   
 Like Henderson, Nixon represented a working class Protestant division of 
Belfast, and a concern for the urban proletariat led the ex-police officer into countless 
clashes with the UUP over living conditions and unemployment. From 1929 to 1937, 
Nixon voted with the government only fourteen times.
78
 Even as an official Unionist 
candidate in the 1925 election, Nixon hinted at this political mindset: ‘he was out and 
out with Sir James Craig on the defence of the border, but on all other matters, his 
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independence was as strong as ever’.79 While his loyalism at times obscured his 
complaints and he was not as consistently vocal as Henderson in registering the 
perceived socio-economic failings of the government, Nixon could ably articulate the 
frustrations of his working class constituents in an era of chronic unemployment.
80
  
 Championing the Protestant proletariat was not the monopoly of the Sloanite 
wing of independent unionism: the other dissidents also offered socio-economic 
criticisms of the UUP. Robert McNeill strongly believed that it was ‘essential that the 
interests of Labour’ were represented in Stormont; he also admitted that he was an 
admirer of the NILP’s Harry Midgley.81 James Gyle framed his socio-economic 
critiques of the Government within the terms of his political star, the amendment of 
the licensing laws for public houses. He was politically savvy enough to occasionally 
draw on the spectre of partition to toughen his message: in 1925, for example, he 
argued that ‘an enormous amount of money had been drained out of Northern Ireland 
into the Free State as a result of the Intoxicating Liquor Act’.82 Woods frequently 
spoke about welfare issues concerning ex-servicemen. But he also had other lines of 
attack: he vocally deplored the exorbitant levels of civil service and parliamentary 
expenditure in Northern Ireland and the employment of Englishmen in public posts 
instead of unemployed Ulstermen.
83
   
 The inter-war independent unionists all held clear socialist and labourist 
sympathies: all the independents voted on the side of the NILP at one time or another. 
Yet it would be incorrect to claim that the dissident unionists were socialists. 
Independent unionism, particularly in its most aggressive form in the persons of 
Henderson and Nixon, only claimed to represent the workers from the Protestant bloc: 
class issues were sectarianised and the independents did not share socialism’s 
interpretation of the capitalist structure. The success of independent unionism in 
working class divisions of Belfast also undermined the NILP’s attempts to attract 
Protestants to labourist politics, as both labels were often in competition for the same 
votes. The re-emergence of Thomas Sloan onto the streets of Belfast in 1926, sixteen 
years after his crushing electoral defeat at the hands of the official party, was a case in 
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point. He attacked the NILP in a series of political meetings held in late summer, 
denouncing its socialism as ‘disloyal’. What the Protestant working class needed, 
claimed Sloan, was not the NILP but the vigilance of Orangemen.
84
 He also voiced 
criticisms of the UUP, but these seemed muted next to his equation of socialism in 
Belfast with the ‘evil’ of Bolshevism.85 The Orange labourism that Sloan advocated 
posed a massive challenge to the NILP and it hugely dented its electoral fortunes in 
Protestant working class areas.
86
 The NILP was more than aware of this: Midgley 
expressed amazement in 1936 at how many votes the independent unionists picked up 
through appeals to sectarianism while lacking any electoral organisation.
87
 As in 
Glasgow, sectarianism posed a major threat to organised labourism in Belfast.
88
 
Contemporaries such as the Minister of Education, Lord Charlemont, saw the 
conservatism of the Orange Order as ‘a bulwark against Socialism’: in 1933, he 
privately believed that ‘Belfast would be largely Socialist tomorrow if it wasn’t for 
the unswerving opposition to Socialism on the part of the Orange Order’.89 The 
Orangeism advocated by independent unionists such as Sloan, Henderson and Nixon 
was a conservative force: it had a powerful hold over sections of the Protestant 
working class, weakening the appeal of socialism in its natural constituency. 
 Despite their vocal condemnation of the UUP’s management skills, the 
independent unionists failed to offer any coherent economic policies beyond 
increasing welfare spending and finding employment for unemployed Protestants. But 
this critique is to view independent unionism in the wrong light. The various 
individuals who stood under the independent unionist banner represented localised 
unionist discontent with the UUP. Without any means to gain political power, the 
independent unionists acted merely as hostile individual pressure groups within 
Stormont, which the Unionist Party, particularly at election time, treated with an 
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obsessive contempt. But the extent to which the independents propagated the need for 
increased spending and employment in Northern Ireland underlines a misreading – 
which may or may not have been deliberate – of the powers that the Stormont regime 
actually possessed.
90
 Northern Ireland was no better prepared than non-devolved 
regions of the United Kingdom for the global economic slump of the 1930s. The 
rhetoric of the independent unionists belied this fact; but they should mostly be seen 
as an outlet for Protestant labourist frustrations, tinged with Orange populism.  
 A factor that fed into the failure of the independent unionists to develop valid 
socio-economic philosophies was the lack of a party machine behind them. One 
organisation that sought to transform the independents from a band of individuals into 
a viable political party appeared in the 1930s, but it was a complete flop. Henderson 
launched the Independent Unionist Association (IUA) in 1933.
91
 He spoke of his 
desire to see unionists of independent thought come together to oppose the UUP; 
rather optimistically he announced that ‘when we have our organisation in working 
order we hope to have twenty-two members’ in Stormont.92 Henderson’s dream, 
however, would never be realised. The IUA struggled to build the structures needed 
for a mass political party. Dissident unionism in the inter-war period was independent 
of party labels and whips, and was chiefly found in several localised areas: a national 
party, in many ways, went against the grain of independent unionism. Further to the 
organisational and ideological problems inherent in an independent party, the pro-
unionist media turned its wrath on the organisation: ‘There is no room in Ulster for 
more than one Unionist Party… The plain truth is that this “Independent Unionist” 
movement is, in effect, an anti-Ulster movement’.93 The IUA contested one election 
to Stormont, in 1938, before folding. Henderson was its sole elected MP as the UUP 
crushed the challenges from within the Protestant bloc, vindicating the words of the 
unionist MP, Robert Lynn: ‘There could not be different types of Unionism’.94 
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Electoral Politics in the Inter-war Period 
The most striking features of electoral competition in inter-war Northern Ireland were 
the intensity of the intra-Protestant battle and the lack of the traditional unionist 
versus nationalist pattern. The UUP aimed to turn every election into a border poll, or 
as the poet John Hewitt succinctly put it, ‘regular plebiscites of loyalty’,95 to defeat 
their independent foes. This contributed to the increasingly sectarian political culture 
of inter-war Northern Ireland, as socio-economic issues were never publicly debated 
within official unionist circles. Independent unionists competed in four of the five 
elections to Stormont between the World Wars. The first election to the Northern Irish 
parliament in 1921 witnessed an impressive display of unionist unity, as the UUP 
returned all its candidates.
96
 The first independent unionist to be elected came in 
1923, when Philip Woods won a by-election in West Belfast. In the next four 
elections before the outbreak of the Second World War, independent unionists and the 
NILP confronted the UUP, eating into the Protestant vote. An analysis of these 
elections offers a valuable insight into the bitter intra-unionist battles and how the 
UUP countered the independent unionist challenge. 
  Craig was a tenacious and talented electioneer. In 1925, he fought the election 
under the shadow of the Boundary Commission; the election of 1933 was fought with 
the republicanism of Fianna Fáil, the new governing party of the Irish Free State 
emphasised; and in 1938, he called a snap election one day after Eamon de Valera, the 
Fianna Fáil Taoiseach, publicised his intention to travel to London for negotiations 
with the British Government, with partition topping the agenda.
97
 The one oddity was 
1929, which was fought without an overt constitutional threat to Northern Ireland. But 
even then, the message from Craigavon
98
 was a familiar one: he claimed that the 
question at stake in 1929 was ‘whether or not Ulster will remain true to Great Britain 
and the Empire’.99 
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 But UUP hegemony was not complete. The constant re-election of Henderson 
and Nixon through the inter-war period, as well as independent unionism’s other 
sporadic victories, revealed the flaws in the government’s programme. The loss of 
four Belfast seats to three independents (as well as three seats to the NILP) in 1925 in 
particular came as a huge shock to the UUP. After the boundary question, the second 
major aspect of the UUP’s campaigns was a repeated condemnation of independent 
unionism. UUP electoral literature equated a vote for an independent unionist as a 
victory for nationalism: it was a gross ‘betrayal of the Loyalist cause’.100 The intra-
unionist clash was heated in 1925: UUP candidates heartedly condemned the 
independents and vice versa, while many editorials in the pro-union press savagely 
came out against the ‘dangerous’ dissidents.101 
 The 1921 and 1925 elections to the northern parliament were conducted under 
a multi-seat constituency proportional representation (PR) system; from 1929 
onwards, a single-member constituency ‘first-past-the-post’ system was used. The 
dynamics of this change originated in the threat posed to unionist hegemony by the 
independents and NILP. Official unionism had long been sceptical about PR: a UUC 
committee reported prior to the first election in Northern Ireland that unity in the 
Protestant ranks was imperative, ‘otherwise under PR undesirable candidates may 
succeed in being elected’.102 In 1925, the worst fears of the committee were realised. 
The three independent candidates polled extremely strongly: Henderson topped the 
poll in North Belfast; Woods topped South Belfast and came second in West Belfast; 
Gyle picked up the third seat in East Belfast. But the PR system offers an additional 
point of interest, namely the destination of transferred votes. This starkly illustrates 
the antagonism between the independent unionists and the UUP. The vast bulk of 
Henderson’s surplus went to the NILP candidate, Sam Kyle, which pulled him over 
the quota and won him the second seat; Nixon, standing unsuccessfully almost as an 
‘independent’ official Unionist, also gained a healthy number of Henderson’s 
transfers. A Town Tenants candidate, much to the chagrin of the official unionists, 
pocketed the overwhelming bulk of Woods’s surplus in South Belfast; in West 
Belfast, Woods benefited from receiving a number of transfers from the nationalist 
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poll topper, Joseph Devlin. Once he passed the quota, half of the independent 
unionist’s surplus went to the NILP candidate, helping him take the final seat. In East 
Belfast, the NILP’s Jack Beattie and the UUP’s Sir Herbert Dixon were elected on 
first preferences. A massive amount of Beattie’s surplus votes went to Gyle; none 
passed from Dixon to the independent.    
 Despite these losses, the UUP still won fifty-five per cent of the vote across 
Northern Ireland, and played down the disappointments in Belfast by focusing on the 
‘emphatic vote of confidence in the Premier’.103 PR became the scapegoat of the 
Belfast losses: its days were numbered after the 1925 election. Shortly afterwards, 
Craig initiated the abolition of PR in favour of single-seat constituencies and the 
‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system. The Prime Minister justified the destruction of 
PR in terms comprehensible to all shades of unionism, suggesting that the PR system 
left an open door to Dublin in Northern Ireland.
104
  
 The UUP’s motive in abolishing PR was simple: it was a hindrance to unionist 
unity and UUP hegemony over the Protestant electorate. By replacing PR with the 
British model of one-seat constituencies, the government aimed to institutionalise 
Northern Ireland’s Protestant/Catholic divide inside Stormont’s chamber. The net 
result was the weakening of independent unionism and the NILP, making it more 
difficult for them to win seats in the northern parliament. Craigavon made this very 
clear in 1927: 
 
Mr Devlin and his party [the nationalists] are the natural opposition; why, 
then, should any loyalist constituency add strength to it and weaken the 
influence of my colleagues and myself?
105
 
 
In such a two-party system, the UUP would always dominate. The government’s 
Chief Whip declared in 1924 that ‘[t]here is no room in Ulster for diversities of 
opinions’:106 the erasing of PR was this attitude in the form of policy. 
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 The results of this change were witnessed at the next election in 1929. Nine 
independent unionists fought the election, six in Belfast constituencies. Only two, 
however, were elected through the ‘first-past-the-post’ system: Henderson and Nixon. 
Robert McNeill later joined them after a prolonged election for the Queen’s 
University seats, which retained the PR system. The independent unionists polled 
over fourteen per cent of the total votes cast in 1929, but comprised less than six per 
cent of the northern parliament’s representation. With only one NILP candidate 
winning a seat in 1929, Craigavon’s decision to abolish PR seemed vindicated.   
 A by-product of adopting the ‘first-past-the-post’ system was that the number 
of uncontested seats rose dramatically, which turned elections into farcical affairs at 
times. In 1933, for example, twenty-seven official Unionists were returned to 
Stormont without a contest, which gave the government a majority of two before the 
polls even opened. The UUP were ecstatic with this result: Anthony Babington, a 
unionist MP, described the large number of uncontested seats, somewhat unwittingly, 
as ‘a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister’.107 Independent unionists contested 
eight seats in 1933, with five Belfast constituencies supplying intra-Protestant battles. 
The government and the pro-union media played an anti-republican card throughout. 
The ascendancy of Fianna Fáil was strongly emphasised, as were the dangers of 
republicanism within the borders of Northern Ireland.
108
 Craigavon focused 
unionism’s attention on the one and only issue in which he was interested: 
 
This General Election is being watched by our political opponents on the Free 
State and across the water to see if there is any weakening on the part of loyal 
Ulster in its allegiance to the Crown… Loyalists cannot afford to play into the 
hands of Nationalists or so-called ‘Independents’ who are hostile to the 
Government and therefore against the best interests of the people. Let ‘Unity’ 
be our watchword.
109
 
 
The pro-Union press concurred with the Prime Minister. Despite the extreme poverty 
and unemployment in Northern Ireland in the 1930s, the Northern Whig recorded that 
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‘the defence of Ulster’s status within the United Kingdom becomes the supreme issue 
of the Election’.110 
 These factors produced a restrictive environment for the independent unionists 
in 1933. Henderson retained the Shankill by the skin of his teeth and McNeill won the 
final seat of the four-seat university contest; Nixon, however, was the independents’ 
great success story, polling a majority of over 2,000 against the official unionist 
candidate in Woodvale. The three sitting independent unionists were the only 
dissidents returned in 1933. Several of the other independent unionist challengers 
polled quite strongly: William Wilton, a member of the Belfast Board of Guardians, 
won over forty per cent of the vote in Oldpark, a similar share to John Woodburn in 
Mid-Antrim, who stood as a representative of farmers’ interests.111 Rural Protestant 
discontent, as represented by Woodburn, constituted a smaller strain of independent 
unionism outside Belfast, which argued that the UUP was not doing enough to 
materially aid ‘loyal’ farmers. But no dissident of this nature was elected in the inter-
war period: the loss of PR was felt particularly by the unsuccessful independents, 
while the government’s constant bombardments of anti-dissident propaganda, coupled 
with the perceived republican threat, were effective electioneering tools. The time, 
effort and expense that UUP candidates put into their anti-independent unionist 
campaigns in 1933 was phenomenal: the Irish News even remarked that ‘[s]everal 
members of the Craigavon Administration have unmistakably shown that they hate 
Independent Unionists even more than they hate Nationalists’.112  
 Unionist politics were publicly fragmented in the 1938 contest, with five 
dissident labels challenging the UUP’s hegemony.113 Not that this altered the UUP’s 
approach: the main issue that the UUP campaigned on was Eamon de Valera’s 
political activities, particularly his constitution of the previous year which laid claim 
to the six counties, and his increasingly militant anti-partition rhetoric. A snap 
election was unionism’s reply. Craigavon wished to use the election to ‘put the 
position of Ulster beyond doubt’, and he strongly emphasised the urgent need to 
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secure unionist unity to rebuff de Valera’s objectives.114 The de Valera factor, 
combined with the surprise of the snap election, effectively stunted the growing band 
of Protestant dissidents, which was Craigavon’s domestic aim. The Progressive 
Unionist Party, a hastily formed liberal unionist party, was crushed at the polls, with 
all ten of its candidates defeated. The electoral environment also hampered the IUA, 
which was compounded by its chaotic organisational structure.
115
 As an umbrella 
group which loosely united various strands of localised independent unionism, the 
IUA did not have the appeal to break through in official unionist heartlands, despite 
winning the public backing of the loyalist Ex-‘A’-Specials’ Association.116 Only one 
of its candidates – Thomas Henderson – was successful, although it did poll quite 
strongly in several constituencies around the country, such as Enniskillen and West 
Down. The IUA’s manifesto, which was hurriedly drawn up, declared that partition 
should not arise as an election issue and that the movement intended to fight on the 
government’s domestic record.117 But Craigavon bluntly asserted that ‘every man who 
voted against the official Loyalist candidate was in favour of the policy of a united 
Ireland’:118 this provocative message was amplified throughout the six counties in a 
zealous manner through rigorous campaigning and an extensive media focus. The 
IUA and the Progressive Unionists failed to alter the election’s main issue: 
unemployment and social conditions were easily brushed aside in the anti-republican 
rhetoric of the 1938 campaign.  
 The inter-war period’s most electorally successful independent unionist, John 
W. Nixon, was, tellingly, not a member of the IUA. His campaign to retain his 
Woodvale seat was colourful: after proclaiming that the ‘Border was as safe as it had 
been for decades’,119 Nixon played throughout on his Protestant credentials, including 
canvassing with a mock King William III.
120
 Nixon shared much ground with the 
IUA, particularly when he argued that Northern Ireland should be classified as an 
economic ‘Special Area’ for the purposes of gaining additional grants from the British 
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Treasury to tackle working class hardship.
121
 He was, however, determined to remain 
a localised independent unionist, accountable only to the Protestants of his 
constituency. And this he did: Nixon increased his majority. But his success proved to 
be the exception rather than the norm for the various strands of dissident unionism in 
1938. The UUP dominated, gaining over fifty-five per cent of the vote. This display 
of strength, however, masked an underlying problem facing the official party. The 
combined non-UUP unionist share of the vote was an impressive twenty-nine per 
cent; but under the ‘first-past-the-post system’ this filtered into less than four percent 
of the MPs at Stormont. 
 The 1938 election starkly revealed several of the deficiencies of the UUP after 
seventeen years of unbroken rule. The faces around the Cabinet table had aged, not 
changed: the large non-UUP unionist vote in 1938 reflected a discontented and 
apathetical attitude bubbling within unionism, pre-empting the difficulties faced by 
the lethargic early wartime administration under John Andrews, who became Prime 
Minister after the death of Craigavon in 1940.
122
 The UUP was invigorated by the 
ascent of the more energetic Sir Basil Brooke to the premiership in 1943, which 
marked the political death of the first generation of unionist ministers. But the dogged 
independent unionism of the inter-war period persisted: Henderson held the Shankill 
seat until 1953, while only death could end Nixon’s reign in Woodvale in 1950. 
 
Conclusion 
‘I know what “Independent” means, and I know what “Unionist” means, but what 
they mean in conjunction I cannot tell, and the first word contradicts the second’.123 
The words of Sir Basil Brooke in 1938 reflected the UUP’s profound distrust of 
‘unofficial’ or ‘independent’ unionism in the inter-war period. From the partitioning 
of Ireland until the outbreak of the Second World War, the independent unionists in 
the northern parliament formed the UUP’s staunchest critics. With the nationalist 
members of Stormont unwilling to fully play the part of parliamentary opposition, that 
role fell to the several members of the NILP and the independents. But they operated 
in an incredibly hostile atmosphere: Craigavon’s administration released large 
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quantities of anti-independent unionist propaganda, which usually equated the 
dissidents with nationalism. The UUP keenly pointed to the fact that the independent 
unionists often voted with the nationalists in Stormont. A substantial number of the 
Protestant electorate in Belfast, though, rejected the UUP’s claims that a vote for an 
independent unionist was a vote for a nationalist; but at the same time it should be 
noted that Henderson and Nixon in particular displayed electoral durability by 
continually promoting their loyalist credentials. This was encouraged, and fed into, 
the UUP’s emphasis on the constitutional question and politico-religious identities, 
the consequence of which left labourist politics an underdeveloped creed in inter-war 
Northern Ireland. 
 The UUP’s fear of Protestant fragmentation dominated its domestic agenda for 
decades. Government rhetoric by the 1960s had altered very little: Brooke declared in 
1966 that ‘never at any time can we Unionists afford to forget that in unity and unity 
alone rests all our strength’.124 Craigavon could have made this speech at almost any 
point during the inter-war period: the intrinsic conservatism of unionism is clear. The 
dangers in the UUP’s fusion of state and party, however, were inherent. In his classic 
commentary on the French Revolution, Edmund Burke forecast the grim 
consequences of political and societal stagnancy within a territory: ‘A state without 
the means of some change is without the means of its conservation’.125 Northern 
Ireland did not possess a mechanism for change, and the consequences of this would 
become clear in the 1960s. Its inert political culture was partly the logical result of the 
UUP’s programme to construct Protestant unity and to destroy attempts to raise socio-
economic issues. Independent unionism highlighted the limitations of this 
programme, but did not, and could not, pose a national threat to the UUP, particularly 
under the asphyxiating conditions of the ‘Protestant Parliament’. 
  The political significance of the independent unionists lies in their 
relationship with the UUP. The intra-unionist battle lines were the most heated during 
the inter-war period, with the official party and pro-Union media almost hysterically 
opposing the Independents. Lord Craigavon headed a government which was guided 
by Protestant populism and was extremely sensitive to unrest within the unionist bloc. 
In the 1930s in particular, his rhetoric was more ‘Protestant’ than ‘unionist’, partly 
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cultivated by the UUP’s reliance on electioneering on loyalist principles. This was 
fostered by the need to confront independent unionism and to provide an agenda 
behind which all unionists could fall. But the independent unionists can also be seen 
as an important safety valve for the government. Loyalist discontent with the UUP 
was transferred to the independents, stunting the growth of socialism within the 
Protestant bloc. Without any formal political power, the independent unionist threat 
could be contained. Containment, however, generally translated into the UUP stealing 
the clothes of their independent rivals, which aided the move within mainstream 
unionism from the conciliatory tones of 1922 to the public Protestant pieties of the 
1930s. While the increasing Catholic ethos of the Irish Free State was an important 
context for the emergence of the ‘Protestant State’, the domestic agenda of the UUP 
should not be overlooked. Protestant unity was imperative for electoral durability; and 
the UUP were very conscious of the appearance of Protestant unity to the eyes of the 
British and Irish governments, particularly when Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
security was seemingly threatened, such as in 1925 and 1938. But the refusal of 
elements of the Protestant electorate to yield to the official party, despite the continual 
electioneering on the border issue, starkly reveals the incomplete nature of UUP 
hegemony.  
